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TERMS OF SERVICE AND THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT: A
TRAP FOR THE UNWARY?
© 2011 David A. Puckett

I. United States v. Lowson and Facebook v. Power Ventures
Technological development poses a unique challenge to Congress. Regardless of how
far-sighted Congress attempts to be in its legislation, the law of unintended consequences may
manifest. Policy effects which are positive, for instance, can be accompanied by unexpected
detriments due to ignorance, error, or contrary intermediate interests. When technological
development proceeds at the pace that has characterized the development of computers in the
past thirty years, these dangers are magnified even more. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA) presents an interesting case of unintended legislative consequences.1 As a product of
the computer systems of the 1980s, the CFAA has proceeded into the Web 2.0 age with
comparatively few modifications. As might be expected from the pace of technological
development in the interim, the interaction between the CFAA and computer systems has
produced some possibly detrimental consequences.
Two cases have recently come before the courts that raise serious concerns about the
future viability and desirability of the CFAA in the face of continuing technological
development. The first of these cases, United States v. Lowson, was recently filed on the federal
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18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 2008).
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criminal docket of the District of New Jersey.2 In Lowson, the defendants were able to bypass a
CAPTCHA3 and were subsequently allowed to use an automated web browser to purchase a
large number of event tickets from Ticketmaster’s ticket sale website, an action in violation of
Ticketmaster’s terms of service agreement (TOS).4 The defendants later resold these tickets at
inflated prices, an action also in violation of Ticketmaster’s TOS.5 As a result of these acts, the
federal prosecutor alleges twenty-three violations of the CFAA, in addition to other federal
crimes.6 If convicted, 7 the defendants in Lowson could face sentences upwards of five years in
prison and sizable fines on each count.8 All of this punishment could be inflicted even though
Ticketmaster was unaffected by the mass purchases. The interface9 accessed by the defendants
was the same as that accessible to the general public, and the price the defendants paid for the
tickets was the price at which the tickets were being sold to the public.10 This begs the question
of whether such violations of contract should have compulsory power.
The second case, Facebook v. Power Ventures from the Northern District of California,
poses many of the same questions as Lowson, but from a civil, rather than criminal,
2

United States v. Lowson, No. 10-114 (D.N.J. filed Feb. 23, 2010) (indictment).
Id. at 9 (defining CAPTCHA as a “Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans
Apart”).
4
Id. at 9-12.
5
Id. at 2.
6
See id. at 49-54.
7
As of Nov. 18, 2010, three of four defendants in United States v. Lowson have accepted plea deals. Two
defendants, Kenneth Lowson and Kristofer Kirsch, pled guilty to a single count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud.
The third defendant, Joel Stevenson, pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge under the CFAA. The remaining counts
were dismissed and United States District Court Judge Hayden agreed to sentencing limits for the two felony
charges. While the fourth defendant, Faisal Nahdi, has not accepted any plea deal, there may not be any final
judgment on the merits of Lowson as Faisal Nahdi “remains at large.” See generally David Voreacos, Two
‘Wiseguys’ Plead Guilty to Hacking Computers in Ticket Scalping Case, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 18, 2010),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-18/-wiseguys-to-plead-guilty-to-ticket-scalping-charges-prosecutorsays.html.
8
18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(c) (West 2008).
9
While the software on the defendant’s computers was not the software expected by Ticketmaster, it interacted with
Ticketmaster’s website in the same way as the web browsers used by the general public. The defendants did not alter
the functioning of Ticketmaster’s website in any way.
10
See Lowson, No. 10-114, at 1-10.
3
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perspective.11 Similar to Lowson, the defendants in Power Ventures engaged in acts which
involved accessing a website through automated means.12 Specifically, the defendants provided
an online service through which social network content could be aggregated.13 Users provided
the defendants with their Facebook passwords, which allowed the defendants to download the
user’s content from Facebook and post it on Power Venture’s website, alongside similar content
from other social networks.14 Facebook’s TOS expressly prohibits such solicitation of
passwords.15 As in Lowson, the automated system used to access Facebook’s website used the
same interface as the general public.16 The main difference between the cases is that the only
compulsion sought in Power Ventures was injunctive relief.17 While injunctive relief may be
less objectionable than prison terms and fines, both cases pose the same question of whether
criminal statutes should provide such contracts with teeth.
In order to fully comprehend this proposition, it is necessary to first understand the
enforcement options which are available. Under the CFAA, access to federally protected
computer systems beyond one’s authorized level of access is a federal crime.18 To meet the
definition of a “federally protected computer system,” a computer need only meet the CFAA
requirement that the computer be used in interstate communication.19 As a result, essentially any
computer communicating over the Internet, manifestly all computers in the United States, would
potentially fall within this category. Punishments of unauthorized access ranges from fines and

11

Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. 08-5780 (N.D.Cal. filed Dec. 30, 2008) (complaint).
See id. at 9-10.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 6-7.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 18.
18
18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a) (West 2008).
19
Id. § 1030(e)(2).
12
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misdemeanor prison terms up to lifetime incarceration. The level of punishment imposed
depends upon (1) the damage caused, (2) the circumstances of the unauthorized access, and (3)
the type of computer system accessed.20 In addition to criminal proceedings, the CFAA also
allows for civil remedies if there are damages or losses exceeding $5000.21 Nowhere in the
CFAA is negligent or reckless access prohibited, only intentional or knowing access.22 Overall,
there are three requirements for a successful action under the CFAA. The offender must (1)
intentionally or knowingly access (2) a federally protected computer (3) without authorization or
beyond his or her limits of authorization.23 Depending on the acts alleged, some form of loss
may also be required.24 In other words, the CFAA could potentially make any use of a website
in a manner not strictly complying with the website’s TOS a federal crime. The sizable range of
provisions that could appear in a website’s TOS lends itself to wide federal authority, which
could subsequently harm many unwary users for actions that have no consequential social harm.
There is some precedent supporting the proposition that breach of a website TOS alone is
sufficient to support a conviction under the CFAA.25 Agreement with this precedent is by no
means unanimous;26 the issue of using the CFAA to enforce website TOS has not yet reached the
United States Supreme Court. Presently, there lies a dispute as to when a TOS breach alone is
sufficient grounds for a federal criminal action. Regardless of the opinions of the lower courts
on the fitness of TOS to inform criminal law, congressional intent must govern the CFAA’s final

20

See id. § 1030(c).
Id. § 1030(g).
22
See id. § 1030.
23
Id.
24
E.g., id. § 1030(g).
25
E.g., America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.,
126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
26
E.g., United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that the use of a TOS agreement as the
basis for a prosecution under the CFAA would render the CFAA unconstitutionally vague).
21
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interpretation.27 In addition, such an interpretation must simultaneously be consistent with the
demands of the United States Constitution.28 Four questions must therefore be answered in
determining whether the holdings desired in Lowson and Power Ventures are indicative of the
future of the CFAA. First, what federal actions under the CFAA are consistent with the intent of
Congress? Second, are federal actions to enforce website TOS under the CFAA consistent with
the requirements of due process? Regardless of the result, it must further be asked whether it is
desirable to enforce website TOS with the CFAA. If not, what means might be employed to
bring the law into accord with the public need?
This note analyzes the interaction between the CFAA, from its initial drafting in 1984
and its substantial amending in 1986 up to the present, and modern developments in Internetbased computer services. Specifically, this note highlights the risks posed by using the CFAA to
enforce website TOS agreements without giving due consideration to the peculiarities of the
TOS contract regime. Part II provides an overview of the origins of the CFAA in light of the
computer security environment that existed in the 1980s and, more importantly, the security
environment that exists today. Part III analyzes the congressional record to determine the actions
Congress intended to criminalize with the CFAA. Part IV traces judicial expansions of the
CFAA, which cover actions not originally conceived by Congress. Part V illustrates problems
that could be created by applying the CFAA to violations of TOS agreements through examples
taken from modern Internet services. Lastly, Part VI concludes this note with a presentation of
possible solutions to the problems posed by the interaction of the CFAA and TOS agreements.

27
28

United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 137 (1803).
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II. The Best of Intentions: The Origins of the CFAA
The Internet seemed a dangerous place in October of 1984. Criminals ran rampant in
America’s computer systems, stealing hundreds of millions of dollars every year, potentially
irradiating cancer patients and absconding with information vital to national security.29 The
present looked grim and the future looked even grimmer. In retrospect, this sort of nightmare
futurism appears slightly unrealistic. Losses due to computer security incidents show no sign of
increasing exponentially with time.30 On the contrary, per capita computer crime losses appear
to have peaked in 2001, then significantly declined.31 The contamination of the anticoagulant
heparin32 has injured far more people than any medical device security breach.33 Moreover, the
release of war logs by Wikileaks, the most prominent case of leaked national security
information in recent memory, was attributable to a disgruntled employee, rather than computer
intrusion.34 These inaccuracies are only obvious through hindsight, however. At the time of the
passage of the CFAA, the general public’s use of computers was a new development. In light of
this, Congress did have good reasons for enacting the CFAA.

29

S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.A.C.A.N. 2479, 2480 (citing Joseph Tompkins, Report
on Computer Crime, 1984 A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUST., 16-44).
30
See Robert Richardson, 2008 CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey, COMPUTER SEC. INST., at 16,
http://www.cse.msstate.edu/~cse6243/readings/CSIsurvey2008.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2011).
31
See id.
32
See Gardiner Harris, Heparin Contamination May Have Been Deliberate, F.D.A. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/30/health/policy/30heparin.html (explaining that heparin, a blood thinner
used by many, may have been deliberately adulterated by an upstream supplier to save money, resulting in eightyone deaths).
33
See generally John Murray, Testimony by John Murray for the Subcommittee on Privacy and Confidentiality,
NAT’L COMM. ON VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS (Nov. 19, 2004), http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/041119p1.htm (citing
statement of John Murray Jr., software compliance expert for the United States FDA Center for Devices &
Radiological Health).
34
Steven Lee Myers, Charges for Soldier Accused of Leak, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/07/world/middleeast/07wikileaks.html (providing information that American
soldier Bradley Manning, alleged source of the logs released on Wikileaks, “complained of personal discontent with
the military and American foreign policies” to an online friend).
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Congress was quite explicit that the wrong it was attempting to address through the
passage of the CFAA was credit card fraud.35 The House stated, “[O]ur society is increasingly
becoming dependent on numerous credit cards and other plastic devices, all of which eventually
involve use of computers and other electronic devices which also are subject to criminal
attack.”36 Due to Congress’ inability to predict the future course of technological development,
the CFAA was laced with broad provisions dealing with access to information instead of
narrower clauses focused on financial transactions.37 History has shown Congress to be correct
in its presumption of prognostic incompetence. In 1978, six years prior to the passage of the
CFAA, approximately five thousand computers existed in the world.38 By 1990, six years after
the passage of the CFAA, twenty million personal computers were being sold every year.39 The
World Wide Web40 was not in existence in 1984, nor was it even seriously contemplated for
another five years.41 In 2008, 71.6% of adult Americans adults had regular access to the World
Wide Web.42 Clearly the penetration of the computer into society has deepened significantly
since Congress first considered the CFAA. Whether Congress’ broadening of an anti-fraud
statute into a general computer crime statute was necessary to deal with such an uncertain future,
however, remains to be proven.

35

H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.A.C.A.N. 3689, 3689.
Id.
37
See id.
38
Id.
39
Jeremy Reimer, Total Share: 30 Years of Personal Computer Market Share Figures, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 14,
2005), http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2005/12/total-share.ars/6.
40
While the terms are often used interchangeably, the World Wide Web is distinct from the Internet. The term
“Internet” refers to a collection of interconnected computer networks. The term “World Wide Web” refers to a
system of interlinked hypertext documents hosted on computers connected to the Internet.
41
Tim Berners-Lee, Information Management: A Proposal, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM,
http://www.w3.org/History/1989/proposal.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
42
See Internet Access and Usage: 2008, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s1120.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2011).
36
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III. Congressional Intent
The intent of Congress in its drafting of the CFAA in 1984, and its later revising of the
CFAA in 1986, seems relatively clear. Congress explicitly did not intend for the CFAA to cover
all possible computer misconduct.
Throughout its consideration of computer crime, the Committee has been
especially concerned about the appropriate scope of Federal jurisdiction in this area. It
has been suggested that, because some States lack comprehensive computer crime
statutes of their own, the Congress should enact as sweeping a Federal statute as
possible so that no computer crime is potentially uncovered. The Committee rejects this
approach and prefers instead to limit Federal jurisdiction over computer crime to those
cases in which there is a compelling Federal interest …. 43
A question is thus raised as to what behavior Congress considered to be a case of
“compelling federal interest.” The language of the CFAA, as well as the congressional record,
shed light on this subject.
A clearer picture of the behavior Congress intended to address can be seen by analyzing
the CFAA in its separate parts. The intent behind most of the provisions of the CFAA is evident
from the plain language of the statute. Subsection (a)(1) of the CFAA, for instance, covers
computers containing information protected against “disclosure for reasons of national defense,
[] foreign relations, … [or] the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ….”44 Clearly Congress intended to
protect computers vital to national security. Subsections (a)(4), (a)(6), and (a)(7) are similarly
straightforward. All three subsections apply explicitly and unequivocally to the use of a
computer in furtherance of fraud or extortion.45 Subsection (a)(3) of the CFAA is likewise
explicit in its protection of federally owned computers, where intrusion would implicate national
43

S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.A.C.A.N. 2479, 2482 (emphasis added).
18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(1) (West 1986) (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(1) (West 2008)).
45
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(4) (West 1986) (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(4) (West 2008)); see 18
U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(6) (West 1986) (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(6) (West 2008)); see 18 U.S.C.A. §
1030(a)(7) (West 1996) (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(7) (West 2008)).
44
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security interests or the administration of justice.46 If all of the provisions of the CFAA were as
textually unambiguous as subsections (a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(6), and (a)(7), the risk of
inconsistent judicial interpretations would be lessened. However, the plain meaning of the
remaining provisions of the CFAA is not as clear, leaving room for disagreement.
Subsection (a)(2) of the CFAA appears, at first glance, to be broader than the rest of the
CFAA. The plain words of subsection (a)(2) indicate a prohibition of all unauthorized access of
any data held on any federal interest computer, all computers in interstate or international
communication,47 in addition to all data held on any computers owned by the federal government
or financial institutions.48 The congressional record, however, indicates that Congress did not
intend subsection (a)(2) to be so broadly construed. The senate report on the amending of the
CFAA reflects this conclusion, stating, “The premise of 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2) will remain the
protection, for privacy reasons, of computerized credit records and computerized information
relating to customers’ relationships with financial institutions.”49 The general protections of
subsection (a)(2), therefore, seem to be aimed entirely at countering financial fraud, Congress’
stated purpose in enacting the CFAA.50 Despite this clear evidence of congressional intent, a
court could easily come to the conclusion that subsection (a)(2) of the CFAA covers virtually
every incidence of computer misuse. All that would be required to reach such a conclusion is for
the text of the statute to be considered alone, an entirely reasonable approach for a court to use.
Subsection (a)(5) of the CFAA seems similarly broad compared to subsection (a)(2). By
its plain terms, subsection (a)(5) of the CFAA covers any actual damage and any federal interest
46

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(3) (West 1986) (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(3) (West 2008)).
18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(2) (West 1986) (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(2) (West 2008)).
48
Id.
49
S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.A.C.A.N. 2479, 2484.
50
H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.A.C.A.N. 3689, 3689.
47
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computer systems.51 This subsection is better understood with reference to the punishment
provisions in subsection (c) of the CFAA. In brief, felony punishments are available when
damage is caused that impairs medical treatment, causes injury or death, creates a threat to public
health or safety, harms the administration of justice or national security, or that meets certain
scope requirements, namely damage to ten or more computers or damage in excess of $5,000.52
The congressional record elaborates further on this subsection by noting that, “[T]his subsection
will be aimed at ‘outsiders,’ i.e., those lacking authorization to access any Federal interest
computer.”53 Thus, the congressional intent behind subsection (a)(5) seems to be the punishment
of trespasses that would ordinarily be punishable under state law were it not for the involvement
of computers and interstate communication. However, a literal reading of this statute could
result in one reaching the conclusion that the CFAA covers a broader range of actions than the
range intended by Congress. For example, the text of subsection (a)(5) fails to reference
outsiders entirely.
Congress intended to do the following when it drafted the CFAA in 1984 and later
amended it in 1986: (1) protect national security, (2) protect consumer financial data, (3) punish
computerized fraud and extortion, and (4) punish computerized trespasses against persons and
chattels.54 None of the amendments to the CFAA subsequent to 1986, consisting largely of
grammar and diction changes in addition to the provision of a civil cause of action under the
CFAA, evidence any significant alterations to this congressional intent.55 Imprecise language,

51

18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(5) (West 1986) (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(5) (West 2008)).
18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(c) (West 1986) (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(c) (West 2008)).
53
S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.A.C.A.N. 2479, 2488.
54
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 1986).
55
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 1988); see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 1989); see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 1990);
see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 1994); see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 1996); see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 2001);
see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 2002); see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 2008).
52
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however, has given the judiciary great leeway to expand the CFAA beyond what Congress
intended in 1984 and 1986. As a result, the current version of the CFAA could potentially
characterize a greater number of individuals as criminals than Congress desired when it enacted
the CFAA.
IV. Judicial Expansion of the CFAA
It must be noted that the actions of the defendants in Lowson and Power Ventures do not
closely coincide with those intended by Congress to be made criminal through the CFAA.56 In
Lowson, the defendants paid Ticketmaster’s requested price for the tickets and in doing so
neither physically harmed a computer system, nor injured an individual, and furthermore perused
no private information.57 In Power Ventures, the defendants had the content owner’s permission
to collect the data they aggregated and, as in Lowson, did no physical damage to any computer
system, or injury to any individual.58 In both cases, the computer systems allegedly misused
were accessed in largely the same manner as was intended by the owners of the system.59
Certainly, the TOS in both cases prohibited automated access, but neither the federal prosecutor
in Lowson, nor the plaintiff in Power Ventures allege that this automated access caused any
damage itself.60 Instead, the alleged damage was caused by the breach of the TOS and the
efforts to remedy this breach, as would be standard in any breach of contract case.61 Despite this
break with Congress, both Lowson and Power Ventures are set to be tried on the merits of their

56

18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 2008).
United States v. Lowson, No. 10-114, at 14-28 (D.N.J. filed Feb. 23, 2010) (indictment).
58
See Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. 08-5780, at 9 (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 30, 2008) (complaint).
59
Id. at 17-18; Lowson, No. 10-114, at 1-10.
60
Id.
61
Id.
57
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CFAA claims.62 The reason for this disconnect is not simply because more actions are being
prosecuted as crimes under subsections (a)(2) or (a)(5) of the CFAA than Congress intended,
though this expansion does play a prominent role.63 Judicial interpretation of ambiguous terms
also has some significance.64 Specifically, judicial interpretation of the term “authorization” in
the CFAA and a judicial focus on the plain language of the CFAA over Congressional intent
have resulted in the door being opened for claims considerably broader than Congress may have
intended.65
A. Judicial Interpretation of “Authorization” in the CFAA
By its terms, the CFAA only prohibits unauthorized access to computer systems or access
that exceeds authorization.66 Cases of unauthorized access do not generally present any
linguistic problem for the courts.67 If there is any modicum of authorization then, tautologically,
either access is authorized or in excess of authorization. Therefore, cases where access exceeded
authorization are the main interpretive problem before the courts. Congress attempted to aid in
this endeavor by defining “exceeds authorized access” in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6).68
Unfortunately, Congress did so with reference to the term “authorization,” which they did not

62

Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. 08-5780, at 2 (N.D. Cal. filed July 20, 2010) (order denying
defendant’s motion for summary judgment); United States v. Lowson, No. 10-114 at 2 (D.N.J. filed Oct. 12, 2010)
(order denying motion to dismiss).
63
See generally United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 466 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (showing the prosecution theory based
on TOS violation and 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(2)(c) was ultimately rejected at trial).
64
E.g., Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1123 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
65
Id.
66
18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(2) (West 2008).
67
See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (standing for the premise that the plain
meaning of a statute governs); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(2) (West 2008) (defining the phrase “without authorization”
having the plain meaning of a complete lack of authorization).
68
18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(6) (West 2008) (“[T]he term ‘exceeds authorized access’ means to access a computer with
authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so
to obtain or alter”).
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also define.69 As a result, some courts have substituted definitions of general use from other
areas of law.
The case of Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc. presents one
of the most influential instances of this type of interpretation in the area of federal actions under
the CFAA. In Shurgard, an employee e-mailed files containing trade secrets to a future
employer from a company computer.70 At all relevant moments, the defendant was actually
permitted to use the computer in question and access the files sent, but the court still found that
the access was unauthorized.71 The court made this finding by referring to section 112 of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency,72 which states, “Unless otherwise agreed, the authority of an
agent terminates if, without knowledge of the principal, he acquires adverse interests or if he is
otherwise guilty of a serious breach of loyalty to the principal.”73 In short, all the Shurgard
interpretation of the CFAA requires to support a finding of access “in excess of authorization” is
a violation of any condition of authorization.
Support for the precedent in Shurgard is by no means unanimous. The court in
International Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda,74 for instance,
expressly rejected the reasoning in Shurgard altogether when applied to similar circumstances.
In Werner-Masuda, an agent of the plaintiff forwarded confidential files to a competitor using a
computer owned by the plaintiff.75 Like in Shurgard, at all relevant points in time the defendant
was expressly permitted to access the computer and the files he forwarded at the time of the

69

See id. § 1030(e).
Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1123 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
71
Id. at 1123-25.
72
Id. at 1125.
73
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958).
74
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d 479 (D. Md. 2005).
75
Id. at 483.
70
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occurrence.76 In both cases, the defendants were prohibited from disclosing confidential
information through either a condition of the employment as in Shurgard, or an explicit
registration agreement as found in Werner-Masuda.77 However, the court in Werner-Masuda did
not follow Shurgard and its use of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.78 Instead, the court
referred to the plain language of the CFAA and the legislative history of its drafting in arriving at
a decision,
Although Plaintiff may characterize it as so, the gravamen of its complaint is not
so much that Werner-Masuda improperly accessed the information contained in
VLodge, but rather what she did with the information once she obtained it. The SECA
and the CFAA, however, do not prohibit the unauthorized disclosure or use of
information, but rather unauthorized access. Nor do their terms proscribe authorized
access for unauthorized or illegitimate purposes.79
Thus, under the reasoning in Werner-Masuda, when a person consents to the use of their
computer system by another, they cannot later claim that such use was beyond authorization.
Despite the differing lines of reasoning in Shurgard and Werner-Masuda, neither approach has
been expressly overruled by a higher court.80 Until such a ruling is made, both approaches must
be considered relevant law. As a result, there is confusion as to which actions are criminally
punishable versus adequately handled by mere termination of employment.
B. Judicial Focus on the Plain Language of the CFAA
While it is true that congressional intent must govern the judicial interpretation of
statutes, it is also true that “[t]he plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive ….”81 In the
case of subsection (a)(2) of the CFAA, the intent of Congress and the plain meaning of the
76

Id. at 497.
Id. at 483.
78
Id. at 499.
79
Id.
80
See generally Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 964 (D. Ariz. Feb 20, 2008) (recognizing the
disagreement between Shurgard and Werner-Masuda).
81
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989).
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statute appear to be in conflict. As a result, judicial interpretation of the CFAA has broadened
this provision of the statute enough to render the rest of the statute surplus.82 As previously
mentioned, the congressional intent behind subsection (a)(2) of the CFAA was to protect
financial privacy.83 However, nowhere in the actual text of the CFAA is this restriction
present.84 As a result, courts have allowed for actions under the CFAA on nothing more than an
allegation that some information was intentionally obtained from a protected computer without
authorization.85 As the court stated in Shurgard:
Nowhere in [the] language of § 1030(a)(2)(C) is the scope limited to entities
with broad privacy repercussions. The statute simply prohibits the obtaining of
information from “any protected computer if the conduct involved an interstate or
foreign communication.” According to the statute, a protected computer is a computer
used in interstate or foreign commerce. This language is unambiguous. There is no
reasonable implication in any of these terms that suggests only the computers of certain
industries are protected.86
As might be imagined, since manifestly all computer transactions involve the exchange of
some information, this construction of the CFAA might allow for actions under the CFAA in
virtually any circumstance of unauthorized access, rendering the rest of the statute altogether
superfluous. There seems to be little disagreement on this interpretation of the language of the
CFAA.87 Thus, until Congress acts to properly implement its stated intent, the broad
interpretation of the CFAA as articulated in Shurgard looks to hold the weight of precedent.
The question remains whether the Shurgard interpretation satisfies the requirements of
due process. United States v. Drew may indicate that the precedent in Shurgard could result in
subsection (a)(2) of the CFAA being unconstitutionally vague, at least in the context of non82
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compliance with a TOS agreement.88 Due process of law requires that criminal laws such as the
CFAA establish minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement.89 The court in Drew asserted
that this due process requirement could not be met if every breach of any TOS provision could
be criminally actionable under subsection (a)(2) of the CFAA.90 To allow such unfettered
federal action would be to grant prosecutors nearly unlimited discretion “to pursue their personal
predilections.”91 Similarly, reference to the Supreme Court’s decision in Grayned v. City of
Rockford reveals further concerns presented by the use of TOS as the sole basis for federal
criminal actions.92 Such vague statutes are considered to offend the Constitution for the
following reasons:
First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly …. Second, if
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit
standards for those who apply them …. Third, but related, where a vague statute
“abut(s) upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,” it “operates to
inhibit the exercise of (those) freedoms.”93
It seems likely that the use of TOS breaches as the sole basis for prosecutions under
subsection (a)(2) of the CFAA would infringe upon all three of these principles. A few examples
may serve to illustrate the problems inherent in conforming TOS agreements to the constitutional
requirements of criminal law.
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V. A Rogue’s Gallery of TOS
Determining the authorized users of a computer system was a comparatively simple
matter when the CFAA was originally drafted due to the relative dearth of public access to
computer networks. The first online service, “The Source,” debuted in 1978.94 This service
provided subscribers access to a small variety of news sources for between $7.75 and $44.75 an
hour.95 The Source was not intended to be accessible to the general public.96 As of 1984, the
service had only “60,000 subscribers.”97 Thus, determining whether a person was authorized to
access such a computer system was as simple as checking whether a subscription had been
obtained.98
The matter of unauthorized access has become more byzantine, and further from the state
of affairs expected by Congress, with modern online services accessible to the general public
over the Internet.99 Practically all of these online services implement a TOS agreement,100 many
of the terms of which can be peculiar. 101 Contracts of adhesion and unusual contract provisions
used together to create criminal standards present a number of practical and constitutional
problems. Such problems can be divided into four general categories: wholly unexpected TOS,
utterly vague TOS, spectacularly complex TOS, and TOS that abut First Amendment freedoms.
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A. Google Search and Unexpected TOS
Turning first to the matter of unexpected TOS, there is perhaps no better example to that
of the TOS covering the use of the Google search engine. Before the actual content of Google’s
TOS can even be approached, the mere fact that Google has a TOS agreement may strike one as
unexpected. The company’s name is in common use as a generalized verb for Internet search
tools.102 The Google search box is integrated into a number of websites and web browsers.103 In
July 2009 alone, Google served 76.7 billion searches which is more than 28,000 searches every
second.104 It seems farcical that the general public would believe that each of those searches
would bind a person to a contract. Google’s homepage does nothing to alleviate this lack of
awareness; nowhere on its homepage is a TOS agreement even mentioned.105 One could
certainly use Google to search for Google’s TOS, but this solution seems to put the cart before
the horse. In a situation such as this, where a public service is accessible with no apparent TOS,
it seems unreasonable to believe that a lay person would be aware of the existence of a TOS
agreement, let alone the conduct required by one.
Even upon reading Google’s TOS, an individual might still be taken by surprise by a
number of the terms. For example, children below the age of majority who search using Google
could be deemed to have accessed a computer system without authorization since Google’s TOS
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specifically exclude minors.106 Furthermore, a Google search is not authorized if the user later
exercises their fair use rights107 with respect to the information obtained in a search or searches
for and uses information in the public domain:108
You may not modify, rent, lease, loan, sell, distribute or create derivative works
based on this Content [“Content” being previously defined as, “[A]ll information (such
as data files, written text, computer software, music, audio files or other sounds,
photographs, videos or other images) which you may have access to as part of, or
through your use of, the Services....”] (either in whole or in part) unless you have been
specifically told that you may do so by Google or by the owners of that Content, in a
separate agreement.109
It is likely Google desires merely to protect its advertising content and avoid any
copyright lawsuits based on contributory infringement through these contract terms.110 The
CFAA, however, contains no provision requiring the cooperation of the owner of a computer
accessed without authorization.111 All that subsection (a)(2)(C) of the CFAA requires to support
a conviction is that a person, “[I]ntentionally accesses a computer without authorization or
exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains … information from any protected computer
….”112 Taken together with Google’s TOS, this subsection of the CFAA could conceivably
snare practically every minor in the United States, and potentially many others, with few being
the wiser. Given the great number of users who could potentially be prosecuted under the
CFAA, it seems likely that any prosecutions that actually occur would essentially be arbitrary.

106

Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE (Apr. 16, 2007), http://www.google.com/accounts/TOS.
Using information from a Google search for the purposes of archiving, commentary, criticism, reporting,
research, scholarship, or teaching, all such uses being excepted from copyright protection.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
See Perfect 10, Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (showing that Google has been sued
under precisely such a theory in the past, albeit unsuccessfully).
111
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 2008).
112
Id. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
107

19

B. YouTube and Vague TOS
Turning second to the matter of vague TOS, YouTube.com (YouTube) provides much by
way of example. The chief source of problems is YouTube’s community guidelines.113 These
guidelines are specifically incorporated into YouTube’s TOS through subsection 6(E) of that
document.114 Among the various provisions of YouTube’s community guidelines can be found
the statement, “Don’t post videos showing bad stuff ….”115 A list of content types that could be
considered “bad stuff” is later provided, but this list is clearly intended to be exemplary, not
exhaustive.116 The uploading of anything from videos of underage drinking to videos of ninja
training could conceivably be a prohibited and, therefore, unauthorized use of the YouTube
service.117
With such general prohibitions, all violations are essentially discretionary. YouTube’s
community guidelines recognize the discretionary nature of violations in the form of an
admonishment, indicating that the guidelines may not mean precisely what they say. The
guidelines state, “Don’t try to look for loopholes or try to lawyer your way around the
guidelines—just understand them and try to respect the spirit in which they were created.”118
The determination of which videos violate the spirit of the guidelines is, of course, solely the
province of the YouTube staff119 or, potentially, a federal prosecutor in a case akin to United
States v. Drew.
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In a purely contractual matter, broad discretion might be wholly unproblematic. Parties
are certainly free to agree to almost any contract terms they choose. Since YouTube’s
community guidelines are incorporated into the service’s TOS, a failure to comply with the
community guidelines would be an unauthorized use of a computer, and therefore a violation of
the CFAA.120 Thus, lawmaking authority would be effectively entrusted to the judgment of the
YouTube content review staff and federal prosecutors, a state of affairs directly implicating the
fundamental principles of the void for vagueness doctrine.121
C. GoDaddy Web Hosting and Complex TOS
Turning third to the matter of complex TOS, the TOS for the GoDaddy.com (GoDaddy)
domain registration and web hosting service can serve to illustrate the problems of excessive
complexity. GoDaddy’s general TOS agreement reflects this notion. At sixteen pages of twelve
point, single spaced text,122 the GoDaddy TOS agreement is 60% longer than the terms one
might come across when obtaining a credit card.123 Problems begin to arise, however, in the
initial paragraph. GoDaddy’s TOS agreement expressly incorporates eleven other subsidiary
agreements covering subjects like trademark infringement and civil subpoenas, and totals another
forty-five pages of text.124 Furthermore, the TOS agreement states that the terms are, “in
addition to (not in lieu of) any specific terms and conditions that apply to the particular Services
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you purchase or access through Go Daddy or this Site.”125 GoDaddy has certainly taken
advantage of this particular contract provision. GoDaddy’s legal agreements page lists another
seventy-two agreements that a service user may have agreed to depending upon the particular
services purchased.126 These subsidiary agreements add an additional 349 pages of text to the
TOS agreement, bringing the total length of the contract to 410 pages.127 In light of this length,
it seems preposterous for GoDaddy to assert, “Your electronic acceptance of this Agreement
signifies that you have read, understand, acknowledge and agree to be bound by this Agreement
….”128 Frankly, it would be a surprise if the average GoDaddy user even read the sixteen pages
of the universal TOS, let alone the remaining 96% of the legal agreement.
The problem of complexity is worsened by the virtually limitless range of provisions that
could be contained in the TOS. As a result, users cannot honestly be considered informed of the
rules that apply to them if these rules are not amenable to perusal. Considering the possible
criminal sanctions that could attach to a violation of the TOS, assuming users are fully aware of
the terms regardless of complexity, seems patently unreasonable.
D. Tripod Web Hosting and TOS that Abut Basic Constitutional Protections
Turning fourth to the matter of potential constitutional bars to using TOS as a basis of
actions under the CFAA, the TOS agreement of the Tripod web hosting service from Lycos
provides an example of a TOS agreement that abuts the First Amendment. The Tripod TOS
agreement contains a list of thirty-seven categories of content which users are not authorized to
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post using the service.129 Only the first category needs to be read before a possible constitutional
violation is presented.
You agree that you will not use Lycos Network Products and Services to:
Upload, post, e-mail, otherwise transmit, or post links to any Content, or select any
member or user name or e-mail address, that is unlawful, harmful, threatening, abusive,
harassing, tortuous, defamatory, vulgar, obscene, pornographic, libelous, invasive of
privacy or publicity rights, hateful, or racially, sexually, ethnically or otherwise
objectionable.130
The chief offending phrase in this contract provision is the prohibition on posting, or even
emailing “content otherwise objectionable.” Lycos is perfectly within its rights to contractually
control the content posted using its service, just as a publishing house can choose the books it
publishes.131 A constitutional problem only becomes apparent when federal power backs this
selection of content.
As stated by the Supreme Court, “[T]he First Amendment, subject only to narrow and
well-understood exceptions, does not countenance governmental control over the content of
messages expressed by private individuals.”132 Does this rule allow for the enforcement of a
facially neutral federal law, the CFAA, when this enforcement would give effect to a contractual
restriction on content? Moreover, is a TOS agreement that abuts constitutional protections
compatible with the requirements of the void-for-vagueness doctrine? It would certainly seem
that all of the principles underlying the void-for-vagueness doctrine would be implicated by a
law incorporating the Tripod TOS.133 After all, a prohibition on posting “content otherwise
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objectionable” provides effectively no guidance to users, establishes no guidelines to govern
enforcement, and would have a great chilling effect on speech.134
VI. Conclusion
As described previously, the current state of the CFAA with regard to TOS is disorderly.
The CFAA fills a vital role in the federal statutory arsenal. Many types of conduct rightfully
prohibited would be difficult to prosecute in the CFAA’s absence. However, the presence of
splits in authority and potential constitutional concerns, results in the CFAA doing a disservice to
the public and the courts. The public is generally unmindful of what conduct will result in
criminal charges, while the courts have to decide criminal cases with little guidance in
circumstances in which civil breach of contract actions may be more appropriate.
A few possible solutions to these problems readily present themselves. The judiciary
could simply be given time to produce a coherent body of precedent interpreting the CFAA and
its relationship with TOS. No relevant cases have yet risen through the courts to the level at
which a final decision of the issue might be obtained, but it seems as though it is only a matter of
time before such a case appears. However, the judicial solution to the TOS problem facing the
CFAA presents a number of shortfalls. First, there is no way of telling how long it will take for
the judiciary to produce a coherent body of precedent on the subject. Approximately twenty-six
years have elapsed since the CFAA first entered the books. It could be many more years before
settled precedent is established. Second, there is no way of predicting the end result of this
litigation. It is quite possible that the courts could arrive at a decision entirely in opposition to
the expectations of the public in regard to the legal status of TOS agreements.
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In light of these shortfalls, it makes sense for a representative governmental body to
resolve the problems facing the CFAA before giving such responsibility to the courts. The
United States Congress is certainly in the best position to address the issue of TOS and the
CFAA. By simply making its intentions explicit, Congress could resolve the entire problem in
one act. If Congress had stated expressly, in 1986, that subsection (a)(2) of the CFAA protected
only financial data, many of the problems which face the courts today would likely never have
arisen. The same is true if Congress had expressly defined “authorization” in the text of the
CFAA and made it clear that subsection (a)(5) of the CFAA applied only to damage caused by
outsiders to the computer system. It is not too late for such changes to be made to the CFAA.
Congress has regularly shown itself willing and able to amend the CFAA when the need arises.
Nine amendments to the CFAA have already been made in only twenty-six years. One more
carefully phrased amendment could resolve most, if not all, of the remaining ambiguities.
If Congress fails to remedy the problems of the CFAA, pressure may grow on state
legislatures to bring the legal status of TOS more in line with public expectations. While the
states cannot directly amend the CFAA, TOS are contracts and contracts generally must abide by
the laws of the states in which they are drafted. Many states, such as California, have consumer
protection law regimes that are both broad and deep.135 It seems as though requirements that
TOS be (1) prominently displayed, (2) affirmatively agreed to, and (3) reasonably intelligible
would fit into these consumer protection regimes quite well, especially when the possible
penalties under the CFAA associated with breaching TOS are considered. Such modifications to
consumer protection law are not without penalty, though. After all, in the absence of a
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consensus amongst the states, a state-by-state approach would only serve to increase the
confusion as to what conduct is made criminal by the CFAA.
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